Newsletter / House of Finance, Goethe-Universität Frankfurt 4/10 by House of Finance <Frankfurt, Main>
Newsletter
The House of Finance • 4
th Quarter 2010
Q4
Consumer Decision Making and Optimal Risk Management 
for Insurance Companies_4
Asset Prices and Business Cycles with Financial Frictions_6
Retail Investor Protection in Closed-end Funds_8
Don’t Tighten the Financial Screws too Much_12
RESEARCH:
RESEARCH:
RESEARCH:
INTERVIEW:
09 HOF-Newsletter  03.12.2010  17:33 Uhr  Seite 1IMPRINT
PUBLISHER:
Prof. Dr. Wolfgang König • Executive Director
House of Finance
Goethe University Frankfurt
EDITORS:
Prof. Dr. Wolfgang König
Bettina Stark-Watzinger
CONTACT:
info@hof.uni-frankfurt.de
www.hof.uni-frankfurt.de
DESIGN:
Novensis Communication GmbH 
Bad Homburg
7
th Edition
Number of Copies: 3.500
Copyright © by House of Finance, Frankfurt am Main
Printed in Germany
NEWSLETTER SUBSCRIPTION
The House of Finance opened in 2008. It inte-
grates Goethe University's interdisciplinary
research on finance, monetary economics, and
corporate and financial law under one umbrella.
Eight academic research and training units work
together in the House of Finance.
As part of its aim to disseminate research results
and to promote an exchange between academics
and practitioners, the House of Finance issues a
newsletter on a quarterly basis.
To subscribe to a printed version of this news  -
letter, please e-mail:
printed-newsletter@hof.uni-frankfurt.de
To subscribe to an internet version, please e-mail:
internet-newsletter@hof.uni-frankfurt.de
09 HOF-Newsletter  03.12.2010  17:33 Uhr  Seite 2Volker Bouffier
Minister President 
of the State of Hessen
3
Editorial • HoF-Newsletter • Quarter 4/2010
J
ust a year after the worst economic and
financial crisis of the last 60 years, Germany
is enjoying a robust recovery. This may make
it all too easy to forget the tremendous turmoil
being experienced by some of our neighbors,
for example, Ireland.
So this is precisely the right time for Germany,
and its economic and financial heart,
Frankfurt, to accept responsibility for guiding
the discourse now required. We have to help
steer the discourse on how the factors behind
the crisis should be corrected, and provide 
the expertise necessary for taking the right
decisions in its aftermath. Leadership must
originate in Frankfurt. This is an opportunity,
not just for the Rhine-Main region, but also
for the whole of Germany. 
The crisis has revealed that those who have
exercised caution, like Germany and other
European countries, have generally fared 
better. Overall, the Frankfurt banking center,
characterized by the concept of “universal
banks”, has proven more resilient than its
Anglo-Saxon counterparts who have relied 
on an investment banking model. Recent
studies indicate that the losses prompted by
the crisis were significantly higher in London
and Paris, and that the policy of striving for 
financial market stability has proven wise and
sustainable.
It is our shared objective to assure that
Frankfurt rises to the challenge of international
competition and continues to be acknowledged
as a leading center for finance, a prime address
for respected, economically strong companies,
and as a place for science and research. With
these goals in mind, it is imperative that we
attract and retain the best minds, so that good
quality and sustainable growth is actually possi-
ble. The House of Finance is a cornerstone in
this respect. By combining research, education,
theory and practice in one place, we have cre-
ated a nucleus where research excellence meets
the world of practice, leading to many fruitful
synergies. 
With the establishment of the European
Systemic Risk Board at the ECB and the loca-
tion of the new European supervisory author-
ity for insurance companies in Frankfurt, a
number of key elements of the European reg-
ulatory architecture will be situated here.  
As residents of Hessen, we are conscious of our
responsibility and confident in the joint efforts
between the financial and political communities.
The Frankfurt Institute for Risk Manage  -
ment and Regulation (FIRM) has been founded
to carry out a lasting review of the causes and
consequences of the financial crisis. It is affiliat-
ed with the House of Finance, and conducts
practice-related research at an international level
while contributing substantially to international
projects in the field of risk management.
The Chair of Insurance, Supervision and
Regulation and the International Center for
Insurance Regulation have been established at
the House of Finance in support of the new
supervisory authority for the European insur-
ance industry. This is one more element in our
efforts to create an international network for
research and teaching, and to develop a com-
mon frame of reference for research and regu-
lation. As a major component of our financial
structure, the German Stock Exchange is a fur-
ther important source of support here.  
However, we also need to ensure that our
financial, industrial and economic systems are
supported by a broad social consensus. The
Federal Government, in particular, is grappling
with a difficult situation right now. While
Germany has been praised for the way in
which it has managed the crisis, many
Germans have the impression that nothing has
changed since the crisis passed.
We are all familiar with the consequences of
such contradictory perceptions. For example,
many believe that the European rescue fund
of  €500 billion is merely a subsidy for the
banking sector. And the argument over bonus-
es has become crucial to evaluating the
integrity of not just a single industry, but also
the actions of a whole government. 
As a political and financial community, we all
share a responsibility for ensuring that the
financial sector is accepted by all segments of
society. This will take much hard work to
achieve, as well as tact and diplomacy in the
face of considerable public scrutiny; a task that
must be shared with unwavering commitment
by politicians and practitioners alike. It will
take nothing less for us to discharge our
responsibility to our fellow citizens.
EDITORIAL
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CONSUMER DECISION MAKING AND OPTIMAL RISK MANAGEMENT
FOR INSURANCE COMPANIES
S
olvency regulation for insurers
and reinsurers in the European
Union is undergoing a significant
change. Besides risk-adjusted capital
requirements and adequate risk man-
agement processes, the future supervi-
sory regime Solvency II demands that
insurers and reinsurers provide public
reports on their solvency and financial
condition. The expectation is that
well-informed insurance buyers will
incorporate an insurer’s financial
soundness into their purchase deci-
sion, and that insurance demand will
incentivize insurers to provide a high
level of safety. Thus, market discipline
will efficiently ensure insurers’ solven-
cy. By conducting a series of experi-
ments, we test how consumers react to
information about insurance default
risk and derive a default risk-sensitive
insurance demand function. Based on
these results, we theoretically analyze
insurers’ optimal risk management
strategies in disciplined insurance
markets. 
To examine under which conditions market
discipline in insurance markets will be effec-
tive, and to make predictions on the conse-
quences of increasing market transparency, we
consider the following questions:
 How do consumers react to information on
insurer default risk?
 How will insurers incorporate consumer be  -
havior into their risk management strategies?
 What are the crucial determinants for the
effectiveness of market discipline in insur-
ance markets?
 To what extent are consolidation activities
and their financial outcome affected by
market discipline?
Prior research on these questions can be divid-
ed into two streams of literature: first, experi-
mental research that examines the consumer
reaction to insurance default risk. However,
from the results here, one can hardly draw
any conclusions about optimal pricing and risk
management for insurers. Second, work with
a few normative approaches for dealing with
insurers’ risk management and incorporating
the consumer reaction to default risk. Howe  -
ver, consumer behavior in these models is not
quantified on an empirical basis.
CONSUMER REACTION TO INSURANCE DEFAULT
RISK
To gain more insight into consumer purchase
behavior and the consumer reaction to different
ways of providing information, we experimen-
tally analyze consumers’ reactions to insurance
default risk (see Zimmer et al., 2009). Con  sis  -
tent with previous research, the results of this
experiment reveal that insurance with default
risk is very unattractive for insurance buyers.
Consumers ask for large reductions in insur-
ance premiums, and a considerable fraction of
consumers completely refuses to accept any
default risk. The latter result indicates that some
consumers find insurance unacceptable as long
as they are still subject to some of the risk they
wanted to get rid of. However, such behavior
cannot be explained by any rational decision
model. We find that irrespective of the choice of
default probability representation, i.e. the rea-
son for default, the framing of the default risk,
and the default-proneness of the reference
insurance, default risk is a very unattractive fea-
ture of insurance contracts for most individuals.
Helmut Gründl 
Goethe University and 
Director International Center 
for Insurance Regulation
Sebastian Schlütter
Goethe University
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In a further experiment, we derive a default
risk-sensitive insurance demand function that
can be incorporated into normative risk man-
agement models for insurance companies (see
Zimmer et al., 2010). For this purpose, partic-
ipants were asked to imagine that they had
inherited a coin collection worth 800 euros
that was threatened by a 5% risk of theft. To
insure against this risk, participants were
offered four insurance contracts with different
levels of default risk. We elicited participants’
actual willingness to pay by using a secret price
mechanism. In addition, participants’ decision
making had real money consequences. Figure
1 illustrates the resulting two-parametric insur-
ance demand function, with price and default
probability as the parameters.
OPTIMAL INSURER RISK MANAGEMENT
To analyze the impact of risk transparency on
insurer behavior, we incorporate this insurance
demand function into a normative stock insurer
model. Under this model, the insurer’s optimal
safety level is the outcome of a balancing act:
on the one hand, a higher safety level increases
profits because the insurer can attract more
customers and offer insurance contracts for
higher prices while, on the other, a higher safe-
ty level reduces shareholders’ limited liability
protection, and causes higher transaction costs
for risk management (e.g. as regards corporate
taxation, agency costs or the transaction costs
for reinsurance). 
In general, the insurer will optimally decide on
a positive probability of ruin once risk man-
agement causes transaction costs. However,
facing the experimentally obtained demand
function – which represents the situation of
perfect transparency – the insurer decides on a
ruin probability of quasi zero, even if transaction
costs for risk management are in place. In this
situation, insurers will have an incentive to
hold capital far above the minimum level stip-
ulated by regulatory requirements, and mar-
ket discipline will be effective.
The type of insurance demand function derived
allows for a closed-form solution for the optimal
safety level and, thus, we can explore the effects
of the model parameters on the insurer’s default
risk (see Schlütter and Gründl, 2010). We find
that the optimal default risk level is low if:
 insurance demand reacts strongly to default
risk
 insurance demand reacts weakly to price
 insurance risks and asset risks have low
volatility
 the risky positions in the asset-liability port-
folio are weakly correlated
 transaction costs for risk management are
relatively low
We also find that how insurance demand reacts
to default risk influences shareholders’ incen-
tives for consolidation and group building. In
markets with default risk transparency, groups
will arrange capital and risk transfers, e.g. in
terms of intra-group reinsurance or capital
guarantees, and achieve higher safety levels 
for their subsidiaries. Since policyholders
reward the additional safety net in terms of 
a higher willingness to pay, the group as a
whole achieves a higher shareholder value 
than the stand-alone insurers. Hence, unlike
the attempts in the prior literature, a conglom-
erate discount and lower shareholder value
cannot be explained by the reduction of share-
holders’ limited liability through diversification.
REFERENCES
Zimmer, A., Schade, C., Gründl, H. (2009)
“Is Default Risk Acceptable When Purchasing
Insurance? Experimental Evidence for Different
Probability Representations, Reasons for Default,
and Framings”,
Journal of Economic Psychology, 30, pp 11 – 23.
Zimmer, A., Gründl, H., Schade, C. (2010)
“Market Discipline by Enforcing Transparency of
Insurers’ Solvency Levels? Results on the Optimal
Corporate Risk Strategy of Insurance Companies”,
Working Paper. 
Schlütter, S., Gründl, H. (2010)
“Risk Management and Group Building in
Disciplined Insurance Markets”,
Working Paper. 
Figure 1: Insurance demand function depending on price and default probability
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his article is a non-technical summa-
ry of the following research paper by
Pedram Nezafat and Ctirad Slavik titled
“Asset Prices and Business Cycles with
Financial Frictions” (2010). 
The big unresolved issue in macroeconomics
and finance that we explore in this paper is that
of the high asset price volatility observed. We
want to understand why the aggregate stock
market is so much more volatile than aggregate
quantities. More specifically, we want to build a
model that would perform well both in terms of
aggregate quantities and asset prices. 
It is true that macroeconomic models with
production (starting with the seminal contri-
bution of Kydland and Prescott, 1982) have
been quite successful in explaining the behav-
ior of aggregate quantities. However, most of
these do not generate hardly any asset price
and asset return volatility. This is because they
assume that capital can be produced one-to-
one from the general consumption good. Then
the price of capital in terms of the general con-
sumption good is constant at one. There is a
large body of literature that has tried to make
changes to the standard framework that
would keep the good fit on the quantity side
and improve our understanding of the asset
price behavior. 
In our paper, we want to see whether building
financial frictions into a macroeconomic
(dynamic stochastic general equilibrium –
DSGE) model could help us understand high
asset price volatility. Financial frictions have
been argued to matter for quantities, but to
our knowledge there is no paper showing a
clear link between financial frictions and high
asset price volatility.
THE DSGE MODEL WITH FINANCIAL FRICTIONS
Our model is one based on the work of Kiyotaki
and Moore (2008). It is an infinite horizon model
with two types of agents: workers who work
and consume, but do not participate in asset
markets, and entrepreneurs who run busi-
nesses, create new capital, consume, but do
not work. Entrepreneurs are the crucial play-
ers in our model.
The model has three major components: tech-
nology, asset markets and primitive shocks. As
for the structure of technology, there are two
technologies. All entrepreneurs can access the
production technology for the general con-
sumption good. However, only a fraction of
entrepreneurs can start new investment proj-
ects. As for the asset market structure, we
assume that capital cannot be directly traded,
and that equity is the only asset traded.
Entrepreneurs without the possibility of start-
ing a new project will want to buy shares in
other projects. Meanwhile, financial friction
restricts the access of an entrepreneur to out-
side financing. An entrepreneur can only
finance a fraction of a project externally, i.e. by
selling equity to other entrepreneurs. Finally,
there are two primitive shocks in our model.
All entrepreneurs are subject to the same
aggregate productivity shock. Also, we assume
that the tightness of financial friction (i.e. the
ratio of outside to total financing) changes
over time. This is a novel feature of our model,
one which we document in the data as well.
ASSET PRICE VOLATILITY IN THE THEORETICAL
MODEL
In the paper, we first show theoretically how
shocks to productivity and the financial friction
ASSET PRICES AND BUSINESS CYCLES WITH FINANCIAL FRICTIONS
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Ctirad Slavik 
Goethe University Frankfurt
Pedram Nezafat 
University of Minnesota
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parameter imply shifts in equity supply and
demand, and thus changes in equity prices. By
doing so, we show that the model has the
potential to generate asset price volatility.
However, we want to know whether the forces
we identify are important quantitatively.
Therefore, we take the model to the data.
THE QUANTITATIVE MODEL
There are two non-standard variables that we
need to determine for our quantitative exer-
cise: the fraction of entrepreneurs who can
start a new project at any given period of time,
and the ratio of outside to total financing. We
set the fraction of firms with a project in the
model equal to the fraction of firms that
undertake a lot of investment relative to their
size in the data. Our calibration is thus moti-
vated by the literature on investment spikes. 
We construct our measure of outside to total
financing as the ratio of funds raised in mar-
kets divided by the fixed investment of the
corporate non-financial sector in the flow of
funds. We then estimate an AR(1) process
(Gaussian first-order autoregressive process)
on this variable and detrended total factor pro-
ductivity. And we use the estimated processes
when we simulate the model.
ASSET PRICE VOLATILITY IN THE QUANTITATIVE
MODEL
We focus on a comparison of two different ver-
sions of the model: that is, one in which both
productivity and financial tightness are stochas-
tic, and another in which financial tightness is
constant and productivity shocks are the only
source of uncertainty. We obtain three main
results. First, we show that shocks to productiv-
ity alone do not generate much asset price
volatility. This result means that financial fric-
tions are not strong propagators of productivity
shocks, which is in line with previous research
(see, for example, Gomes, Yaron and Zhang,
2003). Second, we find that adding shocks to
the financial tightness parameter increases the
asset price volatility dramatically. It is about
80% relative to the aggregate US stock market.
Finally, we find that fluctuations in financial
tightness affect investment, but not so much
output. This is a manifestation of the fact that
in our model investment is the only channel
through which financial frictions affect the
economy. The way forward in this line of
research lies in incorporating other channels
through which financial frictions would affect
other real variables, in particular output.
Nevertheless, we view our results as very prom-
ising and we conclude that financial frictions
seem to contribute to asset price movements
even at times in which no movements in funda-
mentals (productivity and output) are observed.
REFERENCES
Gomes, J. F., Yaron, A., Zhang, L. (2003)
“Asset Prices and Business Cycles with Costly
External Finance”,
Review of Economic Dynamics 6, pp 767 – 788.
Kiyotaki, N., Moore, J. (2008)
“Liquidity, Business Cycles, and Monetary Policy”,
mimeo, http://www.princeton.edu/~kiyotaki/
papers/ChiKM6-1.pdf. 
Kydland, F. E., Prescott, E. C. (1982)
“Time to Build and Aggregate Fluctuations”,
Econometrica, Vol. 50(6), pp 1345 – 1370. 
A full version of the paper can be downloaded at: 
http://www.wiwi.uni-frankfurt.de/pro  fes  -
soren/slavik/res.html 
Figure 1: Volatility of the US Stock Market versus the US GDP
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G
iven the large number of retail
investors who endured high finan-
cial losses during the recent financial cri-
sis, retail investor protection ranks high
on the political agenda. As a result, the
German legislator plans to adopt the so-
called “Draft for debate of an Act on
Strengthening Investor Protection and
Improving the Functionality of the
Capital Markets” (i.e., the Anlegerschutz-
und Funktionsverbesserungsgesetz, BT-
Drs. 17/3628). Generally speaking, this
draft intends to strengthen investor pro-
tection and to improve investors’ trust in
the integrity and fairness of capital mar-
kets. More specifically, the aim of the
draft is to qualify fund shares as “capital
investments”, as per the German Securities
Trading Act (Wertpapier  handels  gesetz,
WpHG). Furthermore, the draft provides
for more detailed information in sales
brochures. Last, but not least, open prop-
erty funds would be subject to a mini-
mum retention period of two years. What
implications does this draft have for the
further development of retail investor
protection regarding closed-end funds?
I.  RETAIL INVESTOR PROTECTION BY WAY OF 
CAPITAL MARKET EFFICIENCY
In general, investor protection under German
law is based on the idea of capital market effi-
ciency. This is reflected in the high priority that
European directives – the essential parameters
for Germany’s investor protection laws – give
to this goal. From this point of departure, sub-
stantial information requirements applicable to
capital investments under the WpHG are of
key importance to attaining efficient capital
markets and, therefore, a high level of retail
investor protection. 
The furtherance of informational efficiency by
market prices requires liquid capital markets
for freely tradable capital investments. However,
closed-end fund shares have the feature that
they are complex long-term capital investments
with a limited fungibility. Therefore, they do
not fall within the reach of the WpHG so far,
which only applies to so-called “financial instru-
ments” (as defined under § 1) requiring fungi-
bility and free tradability. The “Draft for debate
of an Act on Strengthening Investor Protection and
Improving the Functionality of the Capital Markets”
now aims to qualify fund shares as “capital
investments”, as per the WpHG, in order to
extend the requirements for appropriate invest-
ment advice. These would include, for example,
the requirement to record the investor consul-
tation process in a special written protocol or to
disclose the commission for sale.
II.  INVESTOR PROTECTION BY WAY OF CAPITAL
MARKET EFFICIENCY IN THE FACE OF IMPER-
FECT INFORMATION PROCESSING AND IRRA-
TIONAL INVESTMENT BEHAVIOR
Having said this, access to more detailed infor-
mation will only be useful if investors are able
to handle the information effectively with regard
to their investments. As demonstrated, fund
shares are highly complex investments which
are frequently beyond the understanding of
most ordinary investors. At the same time,
there is the risk of an “information overload”.
These foreseeable dangers are at odds with the
legislative idea of efficient information pro-
cessing in capital markets. Indeed, they have
been highlighted by the findings of behavioral
law and economics that call into question the
very idea of “rational investor behavior”.
Behavioral finance, for example, provides
empirical evidence for instances of investor
RETAIL INVESTOR PROTECTION IN CLOSED-END FUNDS – EFFICIENCY, INVESTOR BEHAVIOR
AND EMPOWERMENT IN THE GERMAN “DRAFT FOR DEBATE OF AN ACT ON STRENGTHENING
INVESTOR PROTECTION AND IMPROVING THE FUNCTIONALITY OF THE CAPITAL MARKETS”
Brigitte Haar
Goethe University
Stefan Jobst
Goethe University
09 HOF-Newsletter  03.12.2010  17:33 Uhr  Seite 8overconfidence, optimism bias, hindsight bias,
and the availability heuristic.
Hence, together with increasing the amount of
information available to investors, there may be
a need to simplify the information provided.
Only then, may retail investors actually be able
to handle the information received effectively.
In fact, the so-called “Bond” decision of the
Bundesgerichtshof (Germany’s Federal Court of
Justice) in 1993 already allows for these limita-
tions, stating that the information provided to
an investor has to take into account his/her
individual level of knowledge. This decision, of
course, has only been one step in a case-by-case
process towards an overall concept of an ade-
quate retail investor protection meeting the
needs of modern capital markets.
III.  APPLYING THE CONCEPT OF “INVESTOR
EMPOWERMENT” IN ORDER TO RECONCILE
EFFICIENCY CONCERNS WITH BEHAVIORAL
FINANCE
In light of the recent financial crisis, the short-
comings of the rationality assumption, the sys-
temic risk implied by investor irrationality, and
also the dangers of a consumer protectionist
approach have all become clear. Therefore, a
new regulatory paradigm is beginning to
emerge. Neither informational efficiency nor
behavior-oriented regulatory interventions
seem to do justice to the needs of capital mar-
ket turbulence. There is evidence that regula-
tors are aiming to empower retail investors via
targeted disclosure strategies in order to enhance
trust in the functioning of capital markets.
The  ”Draft for debate of an Act on Strengthening
Investor Protection and Improving the Functionality
of the Capital Markets”, for example, provides for
a new type of information brochure. This
brochure has to contain all of the relevant infor-
mation in a short, comprehensive and standard-
ized manner. It is envisaged that standardization
will allow for investors to make comparisons
(especially with respect to how shares in closed-
end funds match up with other capital invest-
ments), and simplify how they handle informa-
tion. However, at the same time, this gives rea-
son to fear that investors’ expectations about the
risk level for a capital investment may diverge
from its true risk profile under a longer term
perspective. While enhancing this risk even
more, the draft also aims to implement a mini-
mum retention period of two years for those
investing in open property funds. In this regard,
it seems that developing private information ini-
tiatives may be more preferable.
The draft shows that the concept of retail
investor protection is changing. It remains to
be seen whether the German legislator is also
willing to pursue a change of paradigm with
respect to the European Commission’s Draft
Directive for Alternative Investment Fund
Managers (the AIFM draft directive) and the
Packaged Retail Investment Products (PRIP)
initiative, as well as how the remaining ques-
tions concerning the implementation of this
concept will be resolved. It seems possible that
the future of retail investor protection lies not
so much in information efficiency, but in
investor empowerment and investors’ trust in
the functioning of capital markets.
REFERENCES
Haar, B. (2010)
“Anlegerschutz in geschlossenen Fonds – Kapital  -
markteffizienz, Behavioral Finance und Anleger  koor-
dination als Bausteine eines neuen Regulierungs  -
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Festschrift für Klaus Hopt zum 70. Geburtstag –
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Cambridge University Press.
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Figure 1: Transaction volume of Closed-end fund shares on secondary market
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T
he financial crisis has shown that the
regulation of financial markets has
to mitigate the risks of systemic instability
and worldwide contagion without arous-
ing expectations that the equity providers
and creditors of “problem” banks will be
safeguarded from the consequences of
any insolvency by the unconditional 
support of such banks using taxpayers’
money.  
The draft of the German Bank Restructuring
Act (“An act for the restructuring and orderly
liquidation of credit institutions, for the estab-
lishment of a restructuring fund for credit
institutions, and for an extension to the period
of limitation for the liability of the organs of
these institutions according to the German
Stock Corporation Law”) was prepared by the
German Federal Ministry of Finance and
adopted by the German Federal Government
as a legislative proposal. It contains measures
to prevent the insolvency of credit institutions
by means of a two-tier process: in a first 
step, a bank can voluntarily – or under pres-
sure from the German Federal Financial
Supervisory Authority (BaFin) – commence a
restructuring process. In close cooperation with
BaFin, a restructuring advisor is appointed 
by court order to oversee the implementation 
of restructuring measures. As soon as the
restructuring is expected to fail, and a closing
of the bank threatens to destabilize the entire
financial system, a reorganization procedure
can be initiated. The supervisory agency BaFin
is then entitled to order the bank to transfer
the systemically relevant parts of its business
or assets to another entity (the “good bank”).
By doing so, the systemically risky parts of the
bank can be salvaged and restructured.
Meanwhile, the systemically non-relevant
parts of the bank’s business are not secured by
the “good bank”. In this way, shareholders and
creditors of the bank have to bear the burden
of a collapse. 
By limiting the rescue measures to systemi-
cally relevant parts of the financial institu-
tion, the strong incentive for moral hazard
and the enormous burden on taxpayers 
are both reduced. This was previously impos-
sible.
In our view, the Restructuring Act is to a large
degree a suitable solution for one of the major
problems of banking supervision today –
namely, how to internalize the external effects
of systemic risk into the decision making
processes of shareholders, creditors and their
representatives.
1 The success of the measures
adopted will, however, depend on the ability
to determine which of a financial institution’s
commitments are in fact systemically relevant
(and to be salvaged) or systemically non-rele-
vant (and to be liquidated). 
Our main criticism is that the mechanisms of
the Act can only be fully effective if a binding
obligation is imposed on all credit institutions
to permanently sell a specified minimum 
volume of bonds (for instance, 10% of debt
capital) to non-financial institutions. These
bonds may not, in turn, be purchased by other
financial institutions, which would render
them systemically relevant contrary to the
objective of the Act. To achieve this, it would
be necessary to amend the statutory rules 
and regulations for institutional investors, 
life insurers and pension funds. 
COMMENT ON THE GERMAN BANK RESTRUCTURING ACT 
Jan Pieter Krahnen  
Goethe University 
and Director Center for 
Financial Studies
Helmut Siekmann
Goethe University
and Director Institute for
Monetary and Financial Stability
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SELECTED POLICY PLATFORM PUBLICATIONS
The Act also provides for the formation of a
special restructuring fund in order to finance
the stabilizing measures adopted under the
new statutory rules, for instance the future
“bridge bank” to take over parts or all of a sys-
temically relevant financial institution. This
restructuring fund is to be financed by the pro-
ceeds from a specific contribution (i.e. bank
levy) that has to be paid by all banks with sys-
temically risky activities. The levy will be
assessed in such a manner that it reflects the
degree to which a bank’s assets contribute to
overall systemic risk. 
During the legislative process involved,
detailed provisions were added to the original
draft of the Act to make sure that the contri-
bution from the bank levy is truly risk-adjust-
ed. In our view, reinvesting the proceeds of the
bank levy into the respective credit institutions
by way of contingent convertible bonds (CoCo
bonds), instead of feeding a fund, would be
more preferable. Such bonds could then be
converted into equity when deemed appropri-
ate by the supervisory authority.
2
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POLICY PLATFORM NEWS
Prof. Baums has been appointed the German representative in a “Group of Academic
Company Law Experts” by the European Commission . This group, initiated by the Internal
Market and Services DG, will reflect on the European framework for company law and on
possible adjustments and completions thereof. The European Commission is planning a
broader public conference on this topic in May 2011. The expert group will prepare reflec-
tion documents on issues such as the establishment of uniform rules, the level of harmo-
nization and the possibility of having a model company law in Europe.
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DON’T TIGHTEN THE FINANCIAL SCREWS TOO MUCH
D
r. Volker Wissing is a Member
of the German Federal Parlia  -
ment (Bundestag) since 2004. He is a
member of the FDP parliamentary
group. Before being elected to the
Bundestag Dr. Wissing worked as 
judge in his home state, Rheinland-
Pfalz. Among his manifold responsi-
bilities, Dr. Wissing chairs the parlia-
ment’s Finance Committee and is
the spokesman on finance of his
parliamentary group.
In 2011, Germany will see the introduction
of a restructuring fund for the banking
industry, which will be financed by the
financial sector. What does the Federal
Government hope to gain by this action?
Dr. Wissing: The fund represents a systemic
solution for systemic crises. The Hypo Real
Estate case showed particularly clearly that
protective institutions of this kind are indis-
pensable for stabilizing the financial mar-
kets. With this restructuring fund, the
proven state mechanisms for stabilization in
Germany will be set on a permanent founda-
tion. This would include the granting of
guarantees and provisions for financial assis-
tance. The purpose of the fund is to ensure
financing so that an institution that is too big
to fail can be restructured or liquidated in an
orderly manner. This burden will no longer
have to be borne by taxpayers.
In this context, Germany will be introduc-
ing a levy for banking institutions. Who
will be affected by this levy?
Dr. Wissing: This levy must be paid by all
companies that have their own license to
operate as a credit institution in Germany.
We expect it will generate revenues of
about  €1 billion per year. The amount
payable will be based on a progressive pay-
ment scale, reflecting the implications that
an institution has for the financial system.
No market participant will be burdened dis-
proportionately by the forthcoming bank
levy.  
Is Germany planning further taxes for the
financial sector? 
Dr. Wissing: The Federal Government
plans to introduce additional taxes for the
financial sector as of 2012, which are
expected to generate €2 billion per year.
The effect on intra-European competition
must be taken into account when choosing
the appropriate methods of taxation. These
must also not create a situation that would
favor the migration of funds to unregulated
financial centers. According to calculations
by the FDP (Free Democratic Party), the
financial sector already accounts for a quar-
ter of the entire tax revenues for federal
level in Germany. So the financial screws
should not be tightened too much. 
Dr. Volker Wissing 
Member of the German
Federal Parliament
(Bundestag)
09 HOF-Newsletter  03.12.2010  17:33 Uhr  Seite 1213
Selected HoF Publications • HoF-Newsletter • Quarter 4/2010
SELECTED HOUSE OF FINANCE PUBLICATIONS
Baums, T. (2010) 
“Managerhaftung und Verjährung”,  
Zeitschrift für das gesamte Handelsrecht und
Wirtschaftsrecht (ZHR), Vol. 174, pp. 593
Bick, A. (2010) 
“Threshold Effects of Inflation on Economic
Growth in Developing Countries”,  
Economic Letters, Vol. 108, Issue 2, pp. 126 – 129
Cahn, A. (2010) 
“Vorstandsvergütung als Gegenstand recht  licher
Regelung”,  
Festschrift für Klaus J. Hopt, Band 1, 
pp. 431 – 455
Christelis, D., Georgarakos, D., Haliassos, M.
(2010) 
“Differences in Portfolios Across Countries:
Economic Environment versus Household
Characteristics”,  
Center for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
Working Paper No. 8017 
Haar, B. (2010) 
“Das deutsche Ausführungsgesetz zur EU-
Rating-Verordnung – Zwischenetappe auf
dem Weg zu einer europäischen Finanzmarkt  -
architektur”,  
ZBB – Zeitschrift für Bankrecht und Bank  -
wirtschaft, pp. 185
Haar, B. (2010) 
“Haftung für fehlerhafte Ratings von Lehman-
Zertifikaten? – Ein neuer Baustein für ein
verbessertes Regulierungsdesign im Rating  -
sektor?”, 
NZG – Neue Zeitschrift für Gesellschaftsrecht,
Heft 33, pp. 1281
Hennig-Thurau, Th., Malthouse, E.,
Friege, Chr., Gensler, S., Lobschat, L.,
Rangaswamy, A., Skiera, B. (2010) 
“The Impact of New Media on Customer Rela  -
tionships: From Bowling to Pinball”,  
Journal of Service Research, Vol. 13, Issue 3,
pp. 311 – 330
Hinz, O., Spann, M., Hann, Il-H. (2010) 
“Prestige Goods Purchase and Social Status”,  
International Conference on Information
Systems, forthcoming (ICIS) 
Langenbucher, K. (2010) 
“Kommentierung der §§ 291-299, 308-310 AktG
(Vertragskonzernrecht)”,  
Karsten Schmidt/Marcus Lutter (Ed.), Aktien  -
gesetz Kommentar, 2
nd Edition, Verlag Dr. Otto
Schmidt
Milkau, U. (2010) 
“A New Paradigm in Payments: The strengths
of networks”,  
Journal of Payment Strategy & Systems, Vol. 4,
Issue 3, pp. 277 – 288
Siekmann, H. (2010) 
“Die Finanzmarktaufsicht in der Krise”,  
Staatliche Finanzmarktregulierung und Eigen  -
tumsschutz, Deutsch-Türkisches Forum für
Staatsrechtslehre, Band 7, LIT Verlag, Berlin 
Skiera, B., Eckert, J., Hinz, O. (2010) 
“An Analysis of the Importance of the Long
Tail in Search Engine Marketing”,  
forthcoming in Electronic Commerce Research
and Applica  tion 
Wandt, M., Sehrbrock, D. (2010) 
“Regelungsziele der Solvency II-Rahmen-
  richt  linie”,  
Festschrift 50 Jahre Schweizerische Gesell  schaft
für Haftpflicht- und Versiche  rungs  recht, Schult  -
hess, pp. 689 – 706
Wieland, V., Wolters, M. (2010) 
“The Diversity of Forecasts from Macro  -
economic Models of the U.S. Economy”,  
forthcoming in Economic Theory
Zhou-Richter, T., Browne, M. J., Gründl, H.
(2010) 
“Don't They Care? Or, Are They Just Unaware?
Risk Perception and the Demand for Long-
Term Care Insurance”,  
Journal of Risk and Insurance, Vol. 77, 
pp. 715 – 747
09 HOF-Newsletter  03.12.2010  17:33 Uhr  Seite 13ANDREAS HACKETHAL NAMED
“PROFESSOR OF THE YEAR”
Andreas Hackethal, a
member of the House of
Finance and Dean of the
Goethe Business School,
has been named “Professor
of the Year” by the maga-
zine Unicum Beruf. The
jury praised the excellent structure of
Hackethal’s bachelor’s, master’s, and executive
education courses, which prepare students well
for their final entry into the job market.
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LUKAS PAPADEMOS A SENIOR
FELLOW AT THE CFS 
Lukas Papademos has joined
the Center for Financial
Studies as a Senior Fellow.
Papademos, a former Vice-
President of the European
Central Bank, was previ-
ously a professor at
Columbia University and the University of
Athens. Earlier in his career he worked for the
Federal Reserve Board of Boston. Later he
joined the Bank of Greece where he subse-
quently rose to the position of Governor.
NICOLA FUCHS-SCHÜNDELN
WINS AN ERC STARTING GRANT 
Nicola Fuchs-Schündeln has
been awarded a prestigious
ERC Starting Independent
Researcher Grant. Such
grants from the European
Research Council aim to
support up-and-coming
research leaders who are about to establish or
consolidate a proper research team and to start
conducting independent research in Europe. The
scheme targets promising researchers who have
the proven potential of becoming independent
research leaders. Fuchs-Schündeln’s project, titled
“The Role of Preferences and Institutions in
Economic Transitions”, was able to shine in the
extremely competitive process for these grants. WIWI NEWS NOW AVAILABLE ONLINE
The newsletter of the Faculty of Economics and Business Administration is now available as an online subscription.
It provides readers with up-to-date information on the faculty. For more information, please visit:
http://www.wiwi.uni-frankfurt.de/en/faculty/newsletter.html.
INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR INSURANCE REGULATION INAUGURATED
On November 24, 2010, the International Center for Insurance Regulation (ICIR) was officially inaugurated. With
this center, Goethe University establishes itself as a unique global center for scientific research on insurance regula-
tion. The center, headed by Prof. Helmut Gründl, will aim to conduct internationally acknowledged research pro-
viding insights and advice on current issues of interest in the field of insurance regulation. In cooperation with
Goethe Business School, it is envisaged that new theoretical insights will be channeled into executive education pro-
grams for regulators and insurance staff. The ICIR’s proximity to the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions
Authority (EIOPA) will help to further enrich its activities. The ICIR is funded by the Berlin-based Gesamtverband
der Deutschen Versicherungswirtschaft (German Insurance Association) and Germany’s state of Hessen.
JAN PIETER KRAHNEN APPOINT-
ED AN EXPERT BY GERMANY’S
FEDERAL MINISTRY OF FINANCE
Jan Pieter Krahnen, a
Director of the Center for
Financial Studies, has been
appointed a member of
the scientific advisory coun-
cil for Germany’s Federal
Ministry of Finance. This
council was established in the 1960s, and aims
to support politicians by providing them with
advice on the fundamental challenges for the
future. The council has an independent status
and considers itself as being the “scientific con-
science” of the politicians that it serves.
MICHALIS HALIASSOS TO ADVISE
THE GREEK GOVERNMENT
Michalis Haliassos has been
appointed as a member of
Greece’s newly established
National Council for Re  -
search and Technology
(NCRT). This 11-member
council has the mission of
providing advice on how to redesign the insti-
tutional framework governing how research is
conducted and funded in Greece. Haliassos will
be the only economist among the council
members, and will work alongside scientists
from MIT, Brown University, the LSE and other
leading institutions for academic research.
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QUARTERLY EVENT CALENDAR
Thursday, 27
th Frankfurt Seminar in Economics 
12.15 pm Speaker: Nezih Guner, Barcelona Graduate School
of Economics
FEBRUARY
Tuesday, 1
st Finance Seminar 
5.15 pm – 6.30 pm Speaker: Monika Trupp, University of Cologne
Wednesday, 2
nd Brown Bag Seminar Finance:
12 pm – 1 pm  “Banking Competition and Corporate Risk:
Does the Risk Shifting Channel Exist?”
Speaker: Felix Noth, Goethe University
Thursday, 3
rd Frankfurt Seminar in Economics:
12.15 pm “Growth Effects of Financial Globalization”
Speaker: Georgios Georgiadis (joint with Michael
Binder and Sunil Sharma), Goethe University 
Thursday, 3
rd Goethe Business School 
2 pm – 6.45 pm  GMAT Introduction Course and GBS Information
Session
Monday, 7
th E-Finance Lab Jour Fixe: 
5 pm  “The Influence of Product Announcements 
on Stock Market Performance: The Role of
Product Innovativeness, Product Complexity
and Financial Risk”
Speaker: Bernd Skiera, Goethe University
Tuesday, 8
th Finance Seminar
5.15 pm – 6.30 pm  Speaker: Stefan Ruenzi, University of Mannheim
Wednesday, 9
th Brown Bag Seminar Finance
12 pm – 1 pm Speaker: Raimond Maurer, Goethe University
Wednesday, 9
th  CFS Colloquium
Thursday, 10
th Frankfurt Seminar in Economics 
5.15 pm
Friday, 11
th IMFS/LEMF Conference 
1.30 pm “Finanzsektor im Wettbewerb”
Speakers (among others): Prof. Wernhard Möschel,
Dr. Horst Satzky, Prof. Daniel Zimmer, 
Prof. Dr. Hannes Rehm
Tuesday, 15
th Finance Seminar 
5.15 pm – 6.30 pm  Speaker: Peter Feldhütter, Copenhagen Business
School
Wednesday, 16
th Brown Bag Seminar: 
5.15 pm – 6.30 pm  “Valuing employee stock options and 
restricted stock in the presence of market
imperfections”
Speaker: Simon Benninga (joint with Menachem
Abudy), Tel-Aviv University
Thursday, 17
th Frankfurt Seminar in Economics  
12.15 pm  Speaker: Falco Juessen, University of Dortmund
Tuesday, 22
nd EFL Spring Conference 2011:  
2 pm “Financial System Stability – Can IT Contribute
to a Solution?”
Online Registration: www.efinancelab.de/events/
conferences/spring-conference-2011/
Thursday, 24
th HoF Brown Bag Seminar  
12 pm 
MARCH
Wednesday, 2
nd CFS Colloquium
Wednesday, 2
nd Goethe Business School  
2 pm – 6.45 pm   GMAT Introduction Course and GBS Information
Session
Monday, 7
th E-Finance Lab Jour Fixe:  
5 pm “Considering Quality of Service for Complex
Service-based Workflows in the Financial
Services Industry”
Speaker: Dieter Schuller, TU Darmstadt
Wednesday, 23
rd CFS Colloquium
Saturday, 26
th German-American Lawyers´ Association:
Annual Meeting of Legal Sections (DAJV-
Fachgruppentag) in cooperation with the
Institute for Law and Finance (ILF)
Monday, 28
th –  ILF Spring School 2011   
Friday, 8
th of April    “Corporate Law in Legal Consultancy
Practice”
Please refer to http://www.hof.uni-frankfurt.de/de/eventlist.html 
for continuous updates of the event calendar.
JANUARY
Monday, 3
rd E-Finance Lab Jour Fixe: 
5 pm “Competition among electronic markets and
market quality – Evaluation of the MiFID
effect on European equity” 
Speaker: Marco Lutat, Goethe University
Wednesday, 12
th Brown Bag Seminar Finance: 
12 pm – 1 pm “Development and Concentration in the
European Retail Banking Sector” 
Speaker: Frank Müller, Goethe University
Thursday, 13
th Goethe Business School:
2 pm – 6.45 pm GMAT Introduction Course and 
GBS Information Session
Thursday, 13
th Frankfurt Seminar in Economics 
5.15 pm
Tuesday, 18
th Finance Seminar
5.15 pm – 6.30 pm Speaker: Frank de Jong, Tilburg University
Tuesday, 18
th CFS Lecture
Wednesday, 19
th Brown Bag Seminar Finance: 
12 pm – 1 pm  “The Impact of the Financial and Economic
Crisis on Asset Allocation, Work Effort and
Retirement Behavior over the Lifecycle”
Speakers: Jingjing Chai, Raimond Maurer, 
Ralph Rogalla, Goethe University
Thursday, 20
th HoF Brown Bag Seminar: 
12 pm  “Die Europäisierung der Finanzmarktaufsicht”
Speaker: Helmut Siekmann, Institute for Monetary
and Financial Stability
Thursday, 20
th Frankfurt Seminar in Economics 
5.15 pm 
Monday, 24
th Frankfurt Seminar in Economics: 
10.15 am “An International Comparison of Altruism
and Bequest Motives”
Speaker: Charles Yuji Horioka, Osaka University,
Institute of Social and Economic Research
Tuesday, 25
th Goethe Business School Graduation   
3.30 pm – 6 pm
Wednesday, 26
th  Brown Bag Seminar Finance: 
12 pm – 1 pm  “Valuation of Bankable Emission Allowances
in a Stochastic Control Model”
Speaker: Sha He, Goethe University
09 HOF-Newsletter  03.12.2010  17:33 Uhr  Seite 15&
Address:
House of Finance
Goethe University Frankfurt
Grüneburgplatz 1
D-60323 Frankfurt am Main
Contact Person:
Prof. Dr. Wolfgang König
Tel. +49 (0)69 798 34000
Fax +49 (0)69 33910
E-Mail: info@hof.uni-frankfurt.de
Internet: www.hof.uni-frankfurt.de
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